Abstract. In the application of Bayesian methods to metrology, pre-data probabilities play a critical role in the estimation of the model uncertainty. Following the observation that distributions form Riemann's manifolds, methods of differential geometry can be applied to ensure covariant priors and uncertainties independent of parameterization. Paradoxes were found in multi-parameter problems and alternatives were developed; but, when different parameters are of interest, covariance may be lost. This paper overviews information geometry, investigates some key paradoxes, and proposes solutions that preserve covariance.
Introduction
In metrology, the Bayes theorem allows the information about a measurand -jointly delivered by the data and prior knowledge -to be summarized by probability assignments to its values [Jaynes and Bretthorst (2003) ; D'Agostini (2003) ; MacKay (2003) ; Sivia and Skilling (2006) ; von der Linden et al. (2014) ]. This synt hesis is an essential step to express the measurement uncertainty and to take decisions based on the measurand value.
Including the model in the assessment of the measurement uncertainty requires model selection and averaging [Dose (2007) ; Elster and Toman (2010) ; Mana et al. (2012) ; Toman et al. (2012) ; Mana et al. (2014) ; Mana (2015) ]; in turn, this requires the model probabilities, which probabilities are proportional to the marginal likelihood, also termed model evidence. Reporting the posterior distribution -or a summary, like point and interval estimates -and marginal likelihood -to carry out model selection or to estimate the model uncertainty -is part of the data analysis. To make a meaningful posterior distribution and uncertainty assessment, the prior density must be covariant; that is, the prior distributions of different parameterizations must be obtained by transformations of variables. Furthermore, it is necessary that the prior densities are proper.
If a preferred parameterization exists, the prior density of any other parameterization is obtained by transformations of variables. We will not examine how to include explicitly-stated information into prior probability distributions. The idea is to find the
Background
This section introduces Bayesian data analysis, information geometry, and model selection. It does not aim at giving an exhaustive review, but it is a courtesy to metrologists and readers who do not master these fields.
Let us consider the measurement of a scalar quantity α and the sampling distribution p(x|α) of the measurement result x if the measurand value is α, where we use the same symbol both to indicate random variables and to label the space of the their values. The extension to many measurands, the presence of nuisance parameters, and multivariate distributions does not require new concepts and will not be examined in detail. The distribution family M = {p(x|α) : α ∈ R}, whose elements are parameterized by α, is the parametric model of the data. It is worth noting that α is a coordinate labelling the M's elements.
The post-data distribution of the measurand values, which updates the information available prior the measurement and synthesized by the prior density π(α|M), is
where L(α|x) = p(x|α) is the likelihood of the model parameters -which is the sampling distribution itself, now, read as a function of the model parameters given the data. The normalizing constant, which is termed marginal likelihood or evidence,
is the probability distribution of the data given the model. As such, it must be independent of the model parameters. Section 5 will show that (2.2) is crucial in the evaluation of how much the data support the explanation M. The symbols π( |M) and p( | ) will be used to indicate prior and posterior probability densities and the relevant conditioning, not given functions of the arguments.
If no information is available, π(α|M) must not deliver information about α. When it is a continuous variable, we can consider the continuous limit of π n = Prob(α ∈ ∆ n ), where ∆ n is the length of the n-th interval in which the measurand domain has been subdivided and 1 ≤ n ≤ N . Hence, π(α|M) = lim N →∞ π n /∆ n , where max(∆ n ) → 0. Since, in the class of the finitely discrete ones, the uninformative distribution is π n = 1/N , the sought prior density is seemingly found.
However, different limit procedures originate different distributions and nothing indicates what should be preferred. For instance, if ∆ n = A/N , where A is the range of the measurand values, π(α|M) = 1/A will follow. If ∆ n = 1/[µ(α)N ], where µ(α) is any probability measure, the prior density is π(α|M) = µ(α). In the same way, if the measurand is changed to β(α), the β's distribution,
where π(α|M) represents the absence of information and α(β) is the inverse transformation, is, in general, a different function. For instance, if β = α 2 , the transformed distribution is π (β|M) = π( √ β|M)/ √ 4β. Also in this case, since we are as ignorant about β as about α, nothing indicates what prior distribution is to be used.
These difficulties arise because we assumed that no information is available. But this is not true: as the conditioning on M indicates, α labels the elements of the model explaining the data. It is a way to get a representation, to write formulae explicitly, but, in principle, its choice is arbitrary. Hence, a measurand change corresponds to a mere coordinate change. A parameter-free way to express ignorance is to require that the elements of M are equiprobable. Hence, we must supply a metric; this can be done in a natural way, as it will be presently shown.
Information geometry
This section overviews the methods of information geometry as applied to encode by covariant rules the information delivered by the data models into prior densities. To reduce the algebra to a minimum, we consider only the single measurand case; full treatments can be found in [Amari et al. (2007) ; Arwini and Dodson (2008) ].
Let us introduce the probability amplitudes {ψ(x|α) = p(x|α) : p(x|α) ∈ M}. Since they are a subset of the L 2 space of the square-integrable functions, M inherits the 2-norm metric
induced by the L 2 scalar product. To obtain the metric tensor, we observe that the line element is
Next, since
where the units have been chosen in such a way to make the x variable dimensionless, we can rewrite (3.2) as
where L = L(α|x) is the likelihood, the angle brackets indicate the average and J(L; α) is the Fisher information, which is proportional to the metric tensor. It is worth noting that, if ∂ 2 α ln(L) exists, the Fisher information can also be written as The metric tensor is related to the Kullback-Leibler divergence, 6) as follows. By expanding (3.6) in series of dα = α 2 − α and taking the normalization of p(x|α) into account, we obtain
up to higher order terms. Therefore, ds 2 measures the information gain when p(x|α+dα) updates p(x|α).
When there are p parameters, so that
T is a p × 1 matrix, the Fisher information is the
Covariant priors
The prior for the model parameters must embed the parameter meaning in the problem at hand, which is defined by the model that is assumed to explain the data [von der Linden et al. (2014) ]. Therefore, it makes sense to chose a prior density that is the uniform measure of M with respect to its metric, that is,
where, by using the α parameterization, the volume element is
This induces the Jeffreys probability density [Jeffreys (1946 [Jeffreys ( , 1998 ]
which is the continuous limit of a discrete distribution defined over a lattice where the node spacings ensure that the same information is gained when the sampling distribution labelled by a node updates those identified by its neighbourhoods.
The relevance of the Jeffreys rule in metrology and in expressing uncertainties in measurements resides in the metric invariance -that is, the same metric is assumed for all the models that explain the data -and prior covariance under one-to-one coordinate transformations -that is, under reparameterization of the sampling distribution. Covariance makes the post-data distribution (2.1) consistent with transformations of the model parameters. In fact, the left-hand side of (2.1) transforms according to the usual change-of-variable rule. What happens to the right-hand side is that the transformation Jacobian combines with J(L, α) to give the Fisher information about the new variables. This is a consequence of the invariance of the volume element (4.2).
Here is the explicit proof in the single-parameter case. Let β(α) be a one-to-one coordinate transformation, i.e., a reparameterization of the sampling distribution. By application of (2.1), the post-data distribution of the β measurand is
where the normalization factor of J(L ; β) has been omitted, L (β|x) = L α(β)|x is the reparameterized likelihood, α(β) is the inverse transformation, and
by applying the change of variable rule to the p(α|x, M) post-data distribution of α in (2.1), we obtain
Eventually, it is easy to prove that (2.1) and (4.6) deliver the same marginal likelihood. In fact,
where the same normalization factor -by virtue of (4.5) -of J(L; α) and J(L ; β) has been left out. This identity expresses that the marginal distribution of the data is independent of the representation of the model elements.
Model selection and uncertainty
Let the data be explained by a set of mutually exclusive models that are hyperparameterized by k, which can be both discrete (e.g., the cell label of a multinomial model) or continuous (e.g., the domain boundary of the mean of a Gaussian models). Assuming that the {M k } set is complete, by application of the Bayes theorem, the posterior odds on M k explaining the data are [MacKay (2003) ; Sivia and Skilling (2006) ; von der Linden et al. (2014)]
where π(k) is the prior probability of M k and, when, k is continuous, an integration substitutes for the sum. In (5.1), the marginal likelihood of a previous Bayesian analysis, Z(x|k), is the model likelihood. It is worth noting that, since it is the sampling distributions of the data given M k , Z(x|k) must be independent of the model parameters α; in turn, the prior density π(α|k) must be covariant.
The marginal likelihood is proportional to the power of the model to explain the data -the higher is the fitness, the greater Z(x|k) -but inversely proportional to the volume of the parameter space -the greater is the model freedom, the lesser Z(x|k). This characteristic of Z(x|k), known as the Ockham's razor [MacKay (2003); Sivia and Skilling (2006) ; von der Linden et al. (2014)], penalizes the models that, by adjusting the model parameters, have a greater freedom to explain the data. Hence, improper priors, which always correspond to infinite parameter volumes and freedom, make the probability of observing the data set null and, consequently, are never supported; also if they correspond to proper posterior distributions. This issue will be further examined in the next section.
Ensuring that marginal likelihoods do not depend on the M k parameterization makes it possible to calculate the model uncertainty and, in turn, it makes it possible to include the model uncertainty in the error budget [Clyde and George (2004) ]. In the same way as p(α|x, k) expresses the uncertainty of the measurand value -provided that M k explains the data -Prob(k|x) expresses the model uncertainty. By combining the measurand and model distributions and by marginalising over the models, the total uncertainty is expressed by
where, if k is continuous, an integration substitutes for the sum.
Paradox analyses
In the following, to avoid increasing too much the length of the paper, intermediate calculations are omitted. All were carried out with the help of Mathematica
Gaussian model with standardized mean
To exemplify the issues of the use of non-covariant priors, let us consider n independent samples x = [x 1 , x 2 , ...
where both the mean µ and standard deviation σ are unknown. To simplify the analysis, we set the data offset and measurement unit in such a way that the sample mean and (biased) standard deviation are zero and one, respectively. Hence, the sampling distribution of x is
The Berger and Bernardo reference prior [Bernardo (1979) ; Berger et al. (2015) ] to make inferences about the {µ, σ} pair is
which results in the marginal likelihood
where Γ(z) is the Euler gamma function, and posterior distribution
The proportionality sign in (6.3) stresses that, since π BB (µ, σ|M µ ) is improper; hence, the marginal likelihood is defined only up to an undefined factor. Actually, the normalizing factor of π BB (µ, σ|M µ ) is infinite; therefore, Z(x|M µ ) is null. This means that the prior (6.2), more precisely its support, is falsified by the data. This problem will be carefully analysed in the following.
If the measurands are the standardized mean λ = µ/σ and σ, the data model is re-parameterized as
Hence, the sampling distribution (6.1) is reparameterized as
The Berger and Bernardo reference prior [Bernardo (1979) ; Berger et al. (2015) ] to make inferences about the {λ, σ} pair is 
n (nπ) n , (6.7)
Figure 1: Marginal likelihoods of n independent data drawn from the same Gaussian distribution and the Berger and Bernardo reference priors (6.2), blue, and (6.6), magenta.
where K 0 (z) is the modified Bessel function of the second kind, and posterior distribution
Also in this case, since (6.6) is improper, the proportionality sign in (6.7) stresses that Z(x|M λ ) is defined only up to an undefined factor; actually, in the limit when the prior support is R × R + it is zero.
The priors (6.2) and (6.6) are tailored to the different measurands, but they are not covariant. This originates a twofold difficulty. Firstly, notwithstanding they are conditioned to the same sampling distribution, if we insist on such an interpretation, the data probabilities derived from (6.3) and (6.7) are different, as also shown in Fig. 1 . Secondly, after having the distribution (6.4), one can legitimately use it to calculate p(λ, σ|x, M λ ) by changing the variables from {µ, σ} to {λ, σ}. Also in this case, notwithstanding it is conditioned to the same data, sampling distribution, and prior information, the result is different from (6.8).
The paradox is explained by observing that the prior densities (6.2) and (6.6) embed different information. Since they have different metrics, M λ is not a re-parameterization of M µ and, therefore, the two analyses rely on different models. Bayesian model selection might be used to choose between the competing models. However, one must be aware that, in this case, the selection will act on the metrics of the sampling distributions. A second issue is that, since (6.2) and (6.6) are improper, the marginal likelihood (6.3) and (6.7) are defined only apart undefined proportionality factors. This makes model selection meaningless.
Multinormal distribution
Jeffreys [Jeffreys (1946 [Jeffreys ( , 1998 ] modified the rule (4.3) because, as we can understand, when applied to independent Gaussian measurements of many measurands having common variance, the degrees of freedom of the posterior distributions of any measurand subset, depend only on the number of measurements, regardless of the measurand number. This implies that the variance of any measurand is the same, no matter how many are estimated. In this section, we will examine this issue in detail.
Problem statement.
Let X = {x ij } be n realizations of m independent normal variables with unknown means µ i and variance σ 2 , for i = 1, 2, ... m and j = 1, 2, ... n. The sampling distribution of X is
T j , and I m is the m × m identity matrix. The Jeffreys prior of {µ, σ} is
and M is the data model where V µ is the volume of the µ subspace and σ > σ 0 . In the following, the (6.10) support will be identified with R m × R + . However, it is unknown and should be chosen by model selection. This problem will be examined in section 6.4.
The joint post-data distribution of µ and σ is (6.11) where, if the integration domain is extended to R m × R + ,
is the marginal likelihood, Γ(z) is the Euler gamma function, x = [x 1 , x 2 , ... T , scale matrix s 2 I q /n, and mn degrees of freedom
where integration domain is again extended to R m × R + and t 2 = |x − µ | 2 /(ms 2 ). The mean and variance-covariance matrix of µ are
where nm > 2 and I q is the q × q identity matrix.
If m = q = 1, t = (µ − x)/s is a Student variable having n degrees of freedom. However, from a frequentist viewpoint, it is a Student variable having n − 1 degrees of freedom. Furthermore, the variance-covariance matrix (6.14b) is independent of the number q of estimated means. This implies that, for given sample means and pooled variance from mn observations, there would be no greater uncertainty with q means being estimated than with only one. In particular, the variance of any measurand is σ 2 µ = ms 2 /(mn − 2), no matter how many are estimated.
Proposed solution
The degrees of freedom discrepancy is explained by observing that the Bayesian posterior (6.13) assigns probabilities to the winning elements of a measurands population associated with the same X sample. Contrary, the frequentist distribution assigns probabilities to the t-statistic of different X samples given the same measurands. Therefore, there is no reason to expect that the two distributions are the same.
The independence of (6.14b) from q does not mean that the uncertainty is independent of the measurand number. In fact, the one standard-deviation credible region of µ is a q-ball having σ µ radius. The probability that µ is in this region is [Wolfram Research Inc. (2012) ]
2 F 1 q/2, (mn + q)/2, (q + 2)/2, 1/(2 − mn) , (6.15)
Figure 2: Probability that a q-subsets of m measurands is in the one standard-deviation credible region. The data are n independent and identically Gaussian measures of each measurand. It is worth noting that the probability depends only on q and the mn degrees of freedom, which were set to 12.
where dΩ is for the m − 1 angular factors and 2 F 1 (a, b, c; z) is the hypergeometric function. As shown in Fig. 2 , as the number of measurands increases, the probability decreases from the maximum -the probability that µ i is in the [−σ µ , +σ µ ] intervalto zero. Therefore, despite the variance is the same, there is a greater uncertainty with q measurands being simultaneously estimated than with only one.
Multinomial paradox
We now consider the problem of determining how many outcomes to include in a multinomial model. When using the Jeffreys rule, the expected outcome frequencies depend on the number of cells. In particular, frequencies depend on the number of void cells and tend to zero as they tend to the infinity. Since one has the option of adding outcomes, a paradox arises when the observations are explained by models including an arbitrary number of cells, where no event is observed [Bernardo (1989) ; Berger et al. (2015) ].
Problem statement
Suppose x = {x 1 , x 2 , ... x m }, where x i are positive integers, is a realization of multinomial variable. Hence, x ∼ Mu(x|m, θ), where m is the cell number, 16) and n = m i=1 x i is the sample size. The Jeffreys' prior of θ is the Dirichlet distribution where Γ(z) is the Euler gamma function. The posterior distribution of θ given the counts x i and the m-cell explaining model is 
is the marginal likelihood and Θ is the m-dimensional simplex m i=1 θ i = 1. The posterior mean of θ i is [Bernardo (1989) 
Since (6.20) depends on the cell number, a paradox arises when the counts are explained by models including additional cells, where no event is observed. In particular, (6.20) depends on the number of void-cells and tends to zero as m tends to the infinity.
Proposed solution.
If the number of cells is unknown, the model uncertainty must be included into the analysis, as the conditioning over m indicates. Therefore, (6.20) must be averaged over the models, the average being weighed by the model probabilities
where m 1 is the number of non-null elements of x, m 2 is the upper bound to the cell number, and the models are assumed mutually exclusive and equiprobable. The asymptotic behaviour of Prob(m|x) is 1/m n ; hence, models having increasing number of voids cells are less and less probable and contribute less and less to the posterior mean. An example is shown in Fig. 3. 
Stein paradox
When estimating the mean power of a number of signal from Gaussian measurements of their amplitudes, uniform priors of the unknown amplitudes lead to problematic posterior power distribution and expectation. In particular, as the number of signals tends to the infinity, the expected posterior power is inconsistent [Stein (1959) ; Bernardo (1979 Bernardo ( , 2005 Problem statement.
In the simplest form of the Stein paradox, x i are realizations of independent normal variables with unknown means µ i and known variance σ 2 , for i = 1, 2, ..., m. To keep the algebra simple, without loss of generality, we use units where σ = 1; when necessary for the sake of clarity, we will write explicitly quantity ratios vs. σ. The Jeffreys' prior for each µ i is a constant, resulting in independent Gaussian posteriors, N (µ i |x i , σ = 1), for each individual mean. where µ is the {µ 1 , µ 2 , ... µ m } list. The frequentist variance of θ 2 is given by the same (6.22b). As m tends to infinity a worst situation occurs: (6.22a) and (6.22b) predict that θ 2 is certainly equal to x 2 + 1, but, at the same time, (6.23) and (6.22b) predict that θ 2 is certainly equal to x 2 − 1.
Let us consider µ

Proposed solution.
To explain the paradox, we observe that it occurs only if the µ 2 i /m series converges. Otherwise, θ 2 → ∞ and (6.22a) and (6.23) give the same result for all practical purposes. The improper prior π J (µ i ) ∝ const. encodes that |µ i | is greater that any positive number. This information is irrelevant to the µ i posterior -besides, the odds on µ i positive or negative are the same; but, it is not so for the µ 2 i posterior. If |µ i | < ∞, the µ i domain must be bounded. Furthermore, if θ 2 exists, these domains must be bounded also when m → ∞.
A statistical model encoding this information is
m }, where x is the {x 1 , x 2 , ... x m } list. In this way the data model gets a boundary and different hyper-parameters correspond to different models. The Jeffreys distribution of µ i is the gate function
interval and 1/(2a) inside, the a, b hyperparameters being unknown. To infer (6.22a) and (6.22b), the a parameter was assumed large enough to identify the data model with M ∞ . However, this model is not necessarily supported by the data; therefore, model selection and averaging are necessary to take this missing information into account.
To make analytical computations possible, we substitute a Gaussian density for the
prior. We have not yet verified that the inferences made by using a Gaussian prior are not different from those made by using a gate prior. We do not expect qualitative differences, but, if so, it would be interesting to understand why. Hence, in the case of m observations {x i } ∼ m i=1 N (x i |µ i , σ = 1), the Gaussian approximation of the Jeffreys pre-data distribution of µ is
which results in independent and identically distributed µ i having marginal likelihood
and normal posterior 27) which solves the integration.
By applying the Jeffreys rule to the marginal likelihood, 28) which is the probability density of the data given the model and where
2 /m are the sample mean and variance, we obtain the hyperparameter prior
Hence, the odds on M ba explaining the data are [Wolfram Research Inc. (2012) ]
where Γ(a, z 1 , z 2 ) is the generalized incomplete gamma function. Figure 4 shows the probability density (6.30) when m = 1 (left) and m = 20 and s x /σ = 2 (right). It is Let us discuss the m = 1 case, 31) in some details. Firstly, we observe that not all the µ domains are equally supported by the x datum, in particular the R domain is excluded; the model most supported by the data, i.e., the mode of (6.31), is M(x, 1/ √ 3). In the second place, after averaging (6.26a) over (6.31), the posterior distribution of µ and µ 2 are 32a) and the non-central χ
having one degree of freedom and non-centrality parameter x 2 . This is an important and non-trivial result, which demonstrates that the hierarchical model M ba is consistent with the one-level model that uses the improper prior π(µ|M ∞ ) ∝ 1. Therefore, there is no hyper-prior effect on the posterior distributions of µ and µ 2 , whose expected values are E(µ|x, σ = 1) = x and E(µ 2 |x, σ = 1) = 1 + x 2 . However, the µ 2 expectation conditioned to the mode of the (6.31) distribution -that is, to the M(x, 1/ √ 3) model most supported by the data -decreases to 
. Figure 5 shows the difference between the model-averaged mean and x i . When the sample variance s 2 x /σ 2 is small, E(µ i |x i , x, s x , σ = 1) → x i −m(x i −x)/(m+2) and the model average shrinks towards x; more are the measurands, the stronger the shrink. Actually, when m → ∞, data consistency requires that the lower bound of the sample variance is s 2 x /σ 2 = 1; in this case the model average converges to the sample mean. When the sample variance is large, E(µ i |x i , x, s x , σ = 1) → x i and the model average supports the x i datum. This is consistent with a large (small) sample variance supporting the hypothesis that the measurands are different (the same).
The (µ i /σ µ ) 2 measurands are independent and identical non-central χ 2 1 variables having one degree of freedom and non-centrality parameter λ 35) where µ i and σ 2 µ are given by (6.26b) and (6.26c). The expected µ 2 i value is where 6.38) and B = 2s (6.39) In addition to the sample variance, the model average (6.37) depends on both x i and the sample mean; this is a consequence of the prior information that all µ i belong to the same interval. When the sample variance tends to zero and infinity, the model average converges to [Wolfram Research Inc. (2012) ] These results are consistent with a large variance indicating different measurandshence, the model average is x 2 i + 1 -and a unit variance indicating the same measurand -hence, the model average is x 2 . Figure 6 shows the difference between the model average and x 2 , when x i = x. When s 2 x /σ 2 is small, E(µ 2 i |x i , x, s x , σ = 1) → x 2 ; most are the measurands, the nearest is the average. When the sample variance is big, or there is only one measurand, the model average converges to x 2 i + 1. Eventually, let us turn the attention to θ 2 . The expected value is
(1 + a 2 ) 2 (6.42) and, after averaging over the odds on the data models [Wolfram Research Inc. (2012) ], As shown in Fig. 7 , the Stein paradox is solved by observing that, when s 2 x /σ 2 tends to zero -that is, when there is a single measurand, the model average converges to the frequentist estimate x 2 ; most are the measurands, the nearest are the estimates. In the limit of a big sample-variance -that is, when there are many different measurands, the model average converges to x 2 − 1, which is the frequentist unbiased estimate. It is non-obvious and remarkable that, when m → ∞ and, consistently, s 2 x /σ 2 > 1, the model average is always x 2 − 1.
Neyman-Scott paradox
The problem is to estimate the common variance of independent Gaussian observations of different quantities, where the quantity values are not of interest. In the simplest case, this is a fixed effect model with two observations on each quantity. As the number of observed quantities grows without bound, the Jeffreys prior leads to an inconsistent expectation of the common variance [Neyman and Scott (1948) ].
Problem statement.
Let {x 1 , x 2 } i be m independent pairs of independent Gaussian variables having different means µ i and common variance ζ = σ 2 , for i = 1, ... m, all parameters being unknown. By changing the data from {x 1 , x 2 } i to the sample means x i = (x 1i + x 2i )/2 and pooled variance T and ζI m /2 variance-covariance matrix.
The Jeffreys prior of the {µ, ζ} parameters is (6.46) where 47) where the specification ζ 0 = 0 highlights the conditioning over the data-explaining model, and posterior distribution
After the means µ are integrated out, the posterior density and expected value of ζ are
where m ≥ 2, with a variance equal to 50b) where m ≥ 3.
Since 2ms
2 /ζ is a χ 2 m variable having m degrees of freedom, s 2 is a frequentist biased estimator of ζ. In fact,
Also in this case a paradox occurs. As m tends to the infinity, (6.50a) and (6.50b) predict that ζ is certainly equal to s 2 , but, (6.51a) and (6.51b) predict that ζ is certainly equal to 2s 2 . The odds on ζ 0 explaining the data are shown in Fig. 8 . It is worth noting that, in the limit of many observed quantities, the lower bound of the model variance most supported by the data is twice the pooled variance.
The Neymann-Scott paradox is solved by observing that, after averaging (6.56) over ζ 0 with the (6.58) weighs, the expected ζ value is [Wolfram Research Inc. where m ≥ 3. In the limit when m → ∞, E(ζ|x, s 2 ) = 2s 2 , which is the frequentist unbiased estimate.
marginalization paradox
The post-data distribution (6.49) of ζ = σ 2 depends only on the pooled variance s 2 . Since s 2 and x are independent chi-square and normal variables, respectively, it might seem that the x data are irrelevant and can be omitted [Dawid et al. (1973) ; Bernardo (1979) ; Kass and Wasserman (1996) ]. But, it is not so.
To investigate the contribution of x to inferences about ζ, let us discard it and start from the X = {p(s 2 |ζ, m) : ζ ∈ R + } model, where the sampling distribution is that are different from (6.49) and (6.50a).
To explain the paradox, we observe that -as shown by the joint posterior distribution (6.48) -µ and ζ are not independent [Jaynes (2012) ]. Therefore, µ is relevant and its posterior distribution affect (6.49). The posterior distribution (6.62) differs from (6.49) because the information delivered by x has been neglected. As a consequence the ζ variance conditioned to X , is bigger than (6.50b). It is also worth noting that (6.63) does not suffer from the (6.50a) inconsistency and it is the same as (6.59). Our conjectured explanation is as follows. Differently from (6.46), which is conditioned to M 0 , the π J (ζ|X ) ∝ 1/ζ distribution assigns the same probability to any ζ's sub-domain including the zero or infinity and a null probability to any sub-domain including none of the two. Therefore, the biasing effect of (6.46) is removed.
Conclusions
In metrology, assessing the measurement uncertainty requires invariant metrics of the data models and covariant priors. In short,
• the posterior probability density must be covariant for model re-parametrization and, consequently, the prior density must be covariant;
• the Jeffreys priors, which are derived from the volume element of model manifold equipped with the information metric, are sensible choices;
• the posterior probability of a selected model must not be null; therefore, improper priors are not allowed;
• to avoid paradox and inconsistencies, the computation of the posterior probability may involve hierarchical models, model selection, and averaging.
These ideas were tested by the application to a number of key paradoxical problems. Non-uniquenesses were identified in the data-explaining models. In addition, parametric models having an infinite volume, corresponding to improper priors, were found to hide unacknowledged information. After recognizing these issues and taking them into account via hierarchical modelling and model averaging, inconsistencies and paradoxes disappeared.
